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Abstract
This paper extends traditional models of machine learning beyond their one-level structure by
introducing previously obtained problem knowledge into the algorithm or automaton involved.
Some authors studied more advanced than traditional models that utilize some kind of predeter-
mined knowledge, having a two-level structure. However, even in this case, the model has not
re0ected the source and inherited properties of predetermined knowledge. In society, knowledge
is often transmitted from previous generations. The aim of this paper is to construct and study
algorithmic models of learning processes that utilize predetermined or prior knowledge. The
models use recursive, subrecursive, and super-recursive algorithms. Predetermined knowledge
includes: a text description, activity rules (e.g., for cognition), and speci4c structured personal
or social memory. Algorithmic models represent these three forms as separate structured process-
ing systems: automata with (1) advice; (2) structured program; and (3) structured memory. That
yields three basic models for learning systems: polynomially bounded turing machines, Turing
machines, and inductive Turing machines of the 4rst order.
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Keywords: Machine learning; Computation in the limit; Learning in the limit; Turing machine; Inductive
Turing machine
1. Introduction
Cognition in general and learning, in particular, has always been important for the
whole society and separate individuals. Without e9cient learning strategies, neither an
individual nor a society can survive in his/her/its environment. That is why cognition
has been and is one of the central topics of philosophy. Development of humanities
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and social sciences brought cognition in the center of their studies. Development of
education directed essential e@orts to better understanding learning processes. Creation
of computers gave birth to a new area—machine learning.
Learning consists of diverse forms of activity. Further one can consider cognition
as a kind of learning. It is learning from the environment or nature. Such traditional
forms as testing, veri4cation, and detection, as well as such new forms as data mining,
web search, and client monitoring are also kinds of learning.
Traditional models of machine learning have a one-level structure. An algorithm
or automaton begins learning without predetermined problem knowledge. Advanced
models utilize some kind of predetermined knowledge, involving a two-level structure.
However, these models re0ect neither knowledge sources nor means of inheritance. At
the same time, society mainly acquires predetermined knowledge from previous genera-
tions. The whole history of science is a magni4cent example how previous generations
provided knowledge for further development, great discoveries, and unexpected inven-
tions for next generations. The great Newton wrote, “If I have seen a little farther than
others, it is because I have stood on the shoulders of giants.”
To see the situation in more detail, let us consider two events of the 4rst
importance in the whole history of mathematics: creation of and grounding the
calculus.
It is assumed that calculus was created by two great mathematicians: Isaac Newton
and Wilhelm Leibnitz. However, as writes Bell [9], it was inevitable after the work
of Cavalieri, Fermat, Wallis, Barrow, and others that the calculus should presently get
itself organized as an autonomous discipline. The major base of Newton’s work on cal-
culus were results of his teacher Isaac Barrow mostly published in the book Lectiones
Geometricae [15]. Actually, this book explained all main constructions of calculus
application without perceiving the deeper signi4cance and building a formalized mech-
anism. In his turn, Barrow (explicitly or implicitly) utilized results and constructions
of his predecessors: Fermat, Pascal, and even Archimedes. Lectiones Geometricae was
the culmination of the 17th century and previous investigations leading toward the
calculus.
Leibnitz also wrote that he created calculus under the in0uence of the works of
Pascal and other French mathematicians as Leibnitz got his mathematical education
in Paris [15]. It is interesting to remark that there were few if any new applications
in Leibnitz’s series of manuscripts, where he built the calculus, but a formalism was
developed that helped systematize and generalize the diverse geometric results of old
and is used even now in contrast to Newton’s formalism.
After the calculus had been built, other mathematicians, such as Euler, the Bernullis,
and Lagrange, developed it further and found a quantity of important applications in a
variety of 4elds.
Although Newton and Leibnitz built the calculus, they never founded it. The 4rst
prominent mathematician to suggest that the theory of limits was fundamental in cal-
culus was d’Alembert (1754). However, only Cauchy did this grounding to a full
extent in the 19th century. But this was not the end because although the calculus had
been grounded as whole, the main concepts that had been used by Newton (0uxions
and 0uents) and Leibnitz (di@erentials, in4nitely small and in4nite values) were still
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mathematically ungrounded. Only in the 20th century, Robinson formed a base for
these concepts creating the non-standard analysis.
Taking a broader understanding of experience of generations, we see that one culture
can utilize and develop what was gained by another culture. For instance, many cultures
were involved in the evolution of arithmetic. Ancient Greeks based their results on the
achievements of Egypt and Babylonia. After the decline of science and mathematics in
Europe during the middle ages, Greek tradition was cultivated by a school of Arabian
scholars who faithfully translated the Greek classics into Arabic. In addition, Arabian
mathematics incorporated achievements of Indian mathematics, developed both Greek
and Indian results and brought their accomplishments to Europe, where a new stage of
the mathematics development has begun.
All these and many other examples necessitate mathematical modeling of such cog-
nitive and learning processes that take into account knowledge accumulated before the
process starts. In this paper, we build such models. These models employ predeter-
mined knowledge obtained by other similar processes and utilize di@erent kinds of
algorithms: recursive, subrecursive, and super-recursive. Recursive algorithms are al-
gorithms equivalent with respect to their computing power to Turing machines. Super-
recursive algorithms can do more than Turing machines, while subrecursive algorithms
(e.g., 4nite automata) can do less than Turing machines. The main goal of this paper
is a comparison of recursive algorithms such as Turing machines with such super-
recursive algorithms as inductive Turing machines. The utmost goal of this analysis is
learning in the limit modeled by super-recursive algorithms.
2. Theoretical mechanisms for modeling learning processes
According to Webster’s Dictionary, “to learn” is “to gain knowledge, understanding,
or skill by study, instruction, or experience”. This speci4es three distinct forms of
learning:
1. Study as assimilating material from descriptive knowledge sources. This is an active
form of learning. Examples of descriptive knowledge sources are: books, people, data-
and knowledge bases, Internet, etc.
2. Learning by instruction is receiving prescriptive knowledge from outside sources.
This is a passive form of learning. Examples of prescriptive knowledge sources are
people, instruction manual, computer programs, etc.
3. Learning by experience is acquiring knowledge and achieving understanding and
skill from person’s life and behavior. This comes from observation (passive learning
form) and experimentation (active learning form).
There are combinations of di@erent learning forms. They result in interactive learning
experiences, including possibility of reference to printed text, computer 4les, and human
experts.
Both understanding and skill can be formulated as knowledge. Understanding
is knowledge of relations in a system. Skill is a kind of procedural knowledge
that people are able to apply in their activity. Very often skill is implicit
knowledge.
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Here is a working de4nition of learning.
Denition 1. Learning is a process of taking or receiving some information (learning
material) and transforming it. The product is knowledge, state or behavior of a learning
system.
Learning proceeds both from particulars to general presentations (induction) and
from general rules to particular facts (deduction). For instance, when a teacher wants
to learn how to help her student to get better results in the class, she applies the
theory of learning styles to this student and learns how better to teach him. This is
deduction.
In presenting material to be learned there are two complementary classi4cations:
wholeness and transparency.
In the wholeness classi7cation, material to be learned may be:
1. in a complete form represented as a whole;
2. in an incomplete form given/taken by parts of the whole:
a. all parts are given after some time;
b. it is possible to view only some parts.
The transparency classi7cation yields that material to be learned may be:
1. represented explicitly;
2. given/taken in a transformed form:
a. reconstruction of knowledge can be done by known algorithms;
b. reconstruction of knowledge cannot be done by known algorithms.
Another issue is the learning result form. We distinguish between three kinds of learn-
ing:
1. Factual or partial learning. Here a learner determines or 4nds whether some ele-
ment x belongs to a set X (has a property P).
2. Class or enumerative learning. Here a learner represents or separates or builds
elements from some set X (that have a property P).
3. Mechanism or constructive learning. Here a learner builds or 4nds a machine
(mechanism, rules) to generate or separate a set X (all elements with a property P).
Class learning has the potential of being in4nite and becoming or emerging.
Mechanism learning is actually in4nite or existing.
Remark 1. Some researchers do not consider factual knowledge as a kind of knowl-
edge, contrasting facts that are given as input to knowledge that is obtained as a result
of knowledge acquisition system functioning. This approach contradicts the real situa-
tion in science, mathematics, and everyday life. For example, the fact that 2+ 2=4 is
an important part of our knowledge about the ordinary arithmetic. Important elements
of mathematical knowledge are such facts as: e is approximately equal to 2.71, the
set of all real numbers is a 4eld, the set of all integer numbers is a ring, and not all
functions are continuous. Important elements of physical knowledge are such facts as:
the velocity of light in the vacuum is a constant, it is impossible to build a perpetuum
mobile, and that atoms consist of protons, neutrons, and electrons. In everyday life,
journalists, detectives, and the majority of other people are seeking fact and not general
theories or mechanisms.
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People often contrast learning and reasoning (e.g., [4]). However, reasoning is a
powerful intellectual tool. It is used for various purposes: learning/cognition, explana-
tion, persuasion, etc. That is why approaches to learning are similar to the kinds of
reasoning.
The main reasoning schemes correspond to three major types of learning:
• learning from similarity/by analogy (abduction);
• learning from experience or by experimentation (induction);
• learning by rules (deduction).
Thus, inductive inference is the main cognitive strategy in science and also a pop-
ular learning technique. Kelly et al. [23], describe four basic inductive approaches to
learning:
(1) A process is organized obeying the rules motivated by considerations other than
4nding the truth and/or avoiding error (e.g., conformity with practice or
intuition).
(2) The possibility of errors is neglected if there are not “too many” or if they are all
“too remote”.
(3) Even signi4cant possibility of error are forgivable if we do the best we can.
(4) All errors are avoided in the limit.
This classi4cation re0ects three approaches to achievement of a remote goal when
there is a measure of success available. We assume that it is impossible to get the
result simply from initial data. It also implies the necessity to apply some process of
inductive inference.
The 4rst approach, amelioration, starts with some initial object, which is then grad-
ually improved.
The second approach, perfection, starts with some initial object, from which the
procedure moves through some intermediate results to the best outcome.
The third approach, satisfaction, also starts with an initial object but then aims at
some satisfactory result.
It is possible to realize all these approaches by any of the three learning types. Since
the main concern here is inductive learning, we separate three possible situations for
a learning process:
1. Complete or desired knowledge/skill is obtained after a 4nite number of steps and
the learner knows it.
2. Complete or desired knowledge/skill is obtained after a 4nite number of steps but
the learner does not know it.
3. No 4nite number of steps can result in complete or desired knowledge/skill.
This corresponds to three modes of computation [12,13]:
1. Recursive computation.
2. Inductive computation.
3. Limit computation.
There are abstract automata and algorithms that work in each mode. Thus, we
can model the related learning types. In the following the main emphasis is on in-
ductive learning. It provides the most adequate model for learning in nature and
society.
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3. One-level inductive processes
Limiting recursive functions [18] and their version, trial-and-error predicates [28]
were the initial one-level inductive schemes.
Denition 2. A partial function f(x) is called limiting recursive if there is a total
recursive function g(x; n) such that
f(x) = lim
n→∞ g(x; n): (1)
Denition 3. A partial function f(x) is called limiting primitive (partial) recursive if
g(x; n) in (1) is primitive (partial) recursive.
Denition 4. A predicate P(x1; x2; x3; : : : ; xn) is called trial-and-error predicate if there
is a general recursive function g(x1; x2; x3; : : : ; xn; y) such that
P(x1; x2; x3; : : : ; xn) = lim
y→∞ g(x1; x2; x3; : : : ; xn; y)
As in the theory of recursive functions and algorithms, a class of algorithms (func-
tions) de4nes sets that are decidable (enumerable) with respect to this class.
Denition 5. A set X is called limiting recursive (limiting recursively enumerable) if
its characteristic function S(x) (its partial characteristic function CS(x)) is limiting
recursive.
Denition 6. A set X is called limiting primitive (partial) recursive (limiting prim-
itive (partial) recursively enumerable) if its characteristic function S(x) (its partial
characteristic function CS(x)) is limiting primitive (partial) recursive.
Following results that relate the construction of limiting recursion to the arithmetical
hierarchy levels were proved by Gold [18].
Theorem 1. (a) A set S is limiting (partial) recursive if and only if S belongs to the
level 2 ∩2 of the arithmetical hierarchy.
(b) A set S is limiting recursively enumerable if and only if S belongs to the level
2 of the arithmetical hierarchy.
(c) The class of limiting partial recursively enumerable sets is contained in 3, con-
tains 2 ∪2, and is not closed under complementation.
However, the exact location of the class of limiting partial recursively enumerable
sets in the arithmetical hierarchy was not de4ned by Gold.
Later the idea of functions computed in the limit was transformed into the construc-
tion of algorithmic inductive inference and learning in the limit [17]. The development
of this direction brought researchers to the following concept (e.g., [5]).
Denition 7. An inductive inference machine (IIM) M is a generating procedure that
requests inputs from time to time. It produces some words as its partial output also
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from time to time. These words produced by the machine after receiving each portion
of data are called conjectures. The 4nal result of the inductive inference machine M
is the word w to which the computational process of M converges.
Denition 8. If u(n) denotes the conjecture produced by an inductive inference machine
M after receiving the portion of input data with the number n, then the computational
process of the inductive inference machine M stabilizes (or converges) to a word w if
there exists a number n0 ∈ N such that u(n) equals w for any n¿n0.
Here procedure means some algorithmic scheme such as Turing machine that is
described by e@ective operations, but for which it is not speci4ed how the result is
obtained. This means that an inductive inference machine is a super-recursive algorithm.
All these approaches and constructions are synthesized in the concept of inductive
Turing machine. First, we turn to simple inductive Turing machines. They realize
inductive computation of the 7rst level.
The simplest realistic inductive Turing machine has the same structure as a conven-
tional Turing machine with three tapes and three heads: input, working, and output.
This structure is much closer to the architecture of modern computer than that of a
Turing machine with one tape.
Both, inductive and ordinary Turing machines go through similar computational steps.
Their di@erences lie how they determine their outputs. We know that a conventional
Turing machine produces a result only when it halts. We assume that this result is
a word written on the output tape. A simple inductive Turing machine also produces
words as its results. In some cases, it stops at its 4nal state and gives a result like a
conventional Turing machine. The di@erence begins when the machine does not stop.
An inductive Turing machine can give a result without stopping. To show this, we
consider the output tape and assume that the result has to be written on it.
It is possible that in the sequence of computations, the word that is written on the
output tape after some step is not changing although the machine continues to work.
Then the last reached (unchanging) word is taken as the result of this computation.
Thus, an inductive Turing machine does not halt but it still produces a de4nite result
after a 4nite number of computing operations. This explains the name “inductive”. In
induction we also proceed step by step checking if some statement P is true for an
unlimited sequence of cases. When it is found that P is true for each case whatever
number of cases is considered, we conclude that P is true for all cases.
While working without halting, an inductive Turing machine can occasionally change
its output. However, people are able to use machines that occasionally change outputs.
They can be satis4ed that the result just printed is good enough, even if another
(possibly better) result may arrive in the future. And if you continue computing, it
will eventually come. Another example is a program that outputs successively better
approximations to a number. Once a few digits of accuracy are attained, the user
can use the output generated even if the machine is not “done”. All these properties
essentially extend the possibilities and indicate uses of inductive Turing machines.
Theorem 2. For any Turing machine T, there is an inductive Turing machine M such
that M computes the same function as T, i.e., M and T are functionally equivalent.
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This theorem demonstrates that Turing machine is, in some sense, a particular case
of inductive Turing machine.
To show that inductive Turing machines are more powerful than ordinary Turing
machines, we need to 4nd a problem that no ordinary Turing machine can solve and to
explain how some inductive Turing machine solves this problem. To do this, consider
the halting problem for an arbitrary Turing machine. It was proved unsolvable for
Turing machines. Today it is one of the most popular unsolvable problems in the
theory of algorithms.
However, there is an inductive Turing machine M that solves this problem. This
machine M contains a universal Turing machine U as a subroutine. Given a word u
and description D(T) of a Turing machine T, machine M uses machine U to simulate
T with the input u. While U simulates T, machine M produces 0 on the output tape. If
machine U stops, and this means that T halts being applied to u, machine M produces
1 on the output tape. According to the de4nition, the result of M is equal to 1 when T
halts and the result of M is equal to 0 when T never halts. In such a way, M solves
the halting problem.
So, even the simplest inductive Turing machines are more powerful than conventional
Turing machines. At the same time, the development of their structure allowed inductive
Turing machines to achieve much higher computing power than have the simplest
inductive Turing machines described above. This contrasts to such a property of a
conventional Turing machine that by changing its structure, we cannot get greater
computing power.
Abstract automata are used to model, while physical machines are used to real-
ize learning systems. In this case, the forms of predetermined knowledge correspond,
respectively, to separate structural components of the device: infware, software, and
hardware of the automaton.
4. Memory in learning processes
The place where information is stored and preserved is traditionally called memory.
Thus, memory is one of three central components of any learning system. Functioning
of memory in0uences complexity of di@erent processes in a system.
There are three types of complexity of any process (and learning, in particular):
• the complexity of separate steps/operations,
• the complexity of separate subprocesses, and
• the complexity of the whole process.
Two 4rst types of complexity exist on three levels: microlevel, macrolevel, and
megalevel operations and subprocesses.
For example, in a computer, the operations of elements from its ALU are examples
of microlevel operations (e.g., compare two bits, add two bytes) The operations of
ALU are macrolevel operations (e.g., compare two 32 digit numbers, add two 32
digit numbers). Operations from programming languages are examples of megalevel
operations (e.g., x + y, n!).
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Two latter types of process complexity are related to complexity in inductive infer-
ence (and more generally, in learning) considered by Ambainis [2]:
• the complexity of computations necessary for learning, and
• the complexity of learning itself.
Some complexity measures better re0ect properties of computations, while others
better re0ect features of learning. Several attempts to separate these two kinds of
complexity have been made.
For space (memory) complexity, Freivalds et al. [16] did such a separation. They
proposed considering two kinds of memory: long-term memory and short-term memory,
and incorporated this idea in inductive inference machine (IIM), a theoretical device
they developed for inductive inference. IIM uses long-term memory to remember por-
tions of input it has seen and, perhaps, other necessary information. In addition, IIM
has a short-term memory for computations. Each time when IIM reads new input data,
this memory is automatically cleared: it cannot be used to remember information.
The complete triadic strati4cation of process complexity explicates a more developed
three-type-gradation of memory: operation memory, short-term memory, and long-term
memory.
Operation memory performs information storage for separate steps/operations. Con-
sequently, it stores information for the least time.
Short-term memory performs information storage for separate subprocesses. Conse-
quently, it stores information for longer time.
Long-term memory performs information storage for the whole process. Conse-
quently, it stores information for the longest time.
Usually, in arti4cial intelligence (cf., for instance, [26]) and psychology (cf., for
instance, [6]), only the two latter types are considered. However, a more advanced
model of the mind contains all three parts [7,19,33]. The model portrays the mind
as containing three memory stores: sensory, short-term, and long-term. Each store is
characterized by its function (the role it plays in the overall workings of the mind), its
capacity (the amount of information it can hold at any given instant), and its duration
(the length of time it can hold any item of information).
Computers also have three levels of memory: registers, which constitute a special
holding area of the CPU for the numbers the ALU uses for computation; primary
storage, which is electronic circuitry that holds data and program instructions until it
is their turn to be processed; and additional storage media and devices as a long-term
memory [27]. Today two types of long-term storage media are the main ones in use:
magnetic and optical. Primary storage includes: RAM, CMOS memory, and ROM.
Magnetic storage includes: 0oppy disks, hard disks, tapes, and Bernoulli disks. Optical
storage includes CD-ROM and WORM. Memory of a Turing machine is its tape(s).
In addition, it is possible to store information in the states of the Turing machine.
Inductive Turing machines have many more possibilities for memory strati4cation.
They are able to realize all three types of memory, as well as their subtypes.
Experience of an individual or society is usually considered as a big data and knowl-
edge base. Such knowledge includes not only declarative knowledge, but also model,
procedural, and problem knowledge. Knowledge, according to contemporary under-
standing is a system in which connections play a central role. Thus, a structured
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memory of an inductive Turing machine provides e9cient means to represent these
connections and the knowledge system. At the same time, experience also includes
skills and understanding. These attributes cannot be completely reduced to explicit
knowledge—they are mainly related to implicit knowledge.
Experience as implicit knowledge. Examples of implicit knowledge are: weights of
neurons in neural networks [20], connections in a structured memory with a dynamic
structure, and connections between nodes/automata in virtual or potential grid automata
[14].
Implicit knowledge gives an explanation to intuition, at least, for some kind of
intuition. It is possible to consider two forms of implicit knowledge: internally implicit
and externally implicit.
Externally implicit knowledge of an individual is hidden from others, but the indi-
vidual is aware of it. In contrast to this, individual is not aware of his/her internally
implicit knowledge. Accordingly, there are two types of intuition: explicit intuition
based on externally implicit knowledge and implicit intuition based on knowledge that
is internally implicit.
For instance, experimental intuition is an explicit intuition when a person derives
a general pattern from a quantity of examples and then uses it to make decisions in
similar situations.
5. Stratied learning
All kinds of memory considered in the previous section are individual. To study
learning processes that go through generations, we introduce also social memory. If
learning is performed by some class of automata A, then the results of algorithms from
A are stored in this memory. Examples of such classes are:
• the class of all inductive inference machines, and
• the class of all inductive Turing machines.
Acquired experience and knowledge can be embodied or stored in three forms:
◦ as texts describing obtained knowledge (descriptive or propositional representation),
◦ as activity rules (prescriptive or procedural representation), and
◦ as a speci4c structure of individual (personal) or social memory (recreative or struc-
tural representation).
Using this classi4cation, we now consider three classes of learning system models
that utilize experiences of previous generations:
1. Automata with an advice [8].
2. Automata with a structured program [13].
3. Automata with a structured memory [11].
Automata with an advice can preserve in the memory for advice knowledge obtained
by previous generations.
The most popular automaton with an advice is the, so-called, advice-taking Turing
machine [8,30].
Denition 9. An advice function f(x) is some function, the values of which depend
only on the length of x and are written on a special tape of a Turing machine.
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Hence, advice functions provide external information to the machines, just as do
oracles. However, the information provided by an oracle may depend on the actual
input, whereas the information provided by an advice function does not. Indeed, only
the length of the input matters. Consequently, advice-taking Turing machines form a
subclass of Turing machines with oracles.
Advice-taking automata are important in complexity theory. The de4nitions and re-
sults in this theory are often based on special Turing machines that can determine the
result of an oracle “for free”, that is, in constant time.
Denition 10. An advice-taking Turing machine is a Turing machine enhanced with
the possibility to access the advice tape. The access for advice and reading the value
of its advice f(x) takes place in constant time.
The fact that the advice value f(x) can be determined in constant time (while f(x)
can be an intractable or even undecidable function) essentially increases the power and
e9ciency of an advice-taking Turing machine in comparison with a regular Turing
machine. For example, an advice-taking Turing machine can calculate in polynomial
time many functions that a regular Turing machine cannot (including some intractable
ones).
Computations performed by Turing machines with oracles and Turing machines with
advice are non-uniform because a di@erent advice string may be de4ned for every
di@erent length of input.
Automata with structured programs can preserve knowledge obtained by previous
generations in the form of a program.
Automata with structured memory can preserve knowledge obtained by previous
generations in the form of the structure of their memory.
Thus, the function P(n) gives a boundary for time complexity of T .
Modern neurobiological studies show that automata with structured memory pro-
vide relevant models for representation of learning processes in the brain. According
to Knudsen [24], learning is a balance of innate and experiential in0uences. The ca-
pacity of a network to learn from experience is limited by innate factors that estab-
lish and re4ne initial patterns of connectivity [22]. These patterns represent speci4c
substructures in the structured memory of a learning system. In biological systems,
these patterns of connectivity can contain remarkable speci4city, imparting a high de-
gree of functionality that re0ects many generations of selections [32]. This gives evi-
dence to the hypothesis that experience of generations accumulates in structures of the
memory.
The structure of any inductive Turing machine, as an abstract automaton, consists
of three components, which we can call hardware, software, and infware. We begin
with the infware, that is, with a description and speci4cation of information that is
processed by an inductive Turing machine. Computer infware consists of information,
or more exactly, data processed by the computer. An inductive Turing machine M is
an abstract automaton, which works with symbolic information in the form of words
of formal languages. Consequently, formal languages with which M works constitute
its infware. Usually, these languages are divided into three categories: input, output,
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and working language(s). In contrast to the languages of everyday life (e.g., English,
German or French), inductive Turing machines use formal languages.
A formal language L consists of three parts: the alphabet A of L, a 4nite set of
symbols; the set A∗ of all words in A, which are 4nite strings of symbols; and the
subset L of the set A∗. Elements from L are called the words of the language L. The
set L is often represented by generating rules RG, i.e., the rules that build words from
L, or by selection rules RS , i.e., the rules that separate words that belong to L from all
other words in A∗.
The language L of an inductive Turing machine consists of three parts L=(LI;LW;
LO) where LI is the input language, LW is the working language, and LO is the output
language of M . Each of them has the following structure LX = (AX; RX; LX) where AX
is the alphabet, RX is the set of generating rules, and LX is the set of all words of the
language LX where X is one of the symbols I, O or W. Usually the generating rules
for formal languages as a whole consist of one operation, which is called concatenation
and combines two words into one. For example, if x and y are words, then xy is the
concatenation of x and y. Taking the alphabet AX = {1; 0} with two words x=1001
and y=001 in this alphabet, we have 1001001 as the result of concatenation. The set
A∗ of all 4nite strings in the alphabet A is also a formal language; it includes the empty
word  that contains no symbols. Because a formal language is an arbitrary subset of
A∗, it is possible to consider the languages of an inductive Turing machine M as one
language L(M), which consists of three parts: LI;LW, and LO.
Now let us look at the hardware or device D of the inductive Turing machine M
with a structured memory. Computer hardware consists of all devices (the processor,
system of memory, display, keyboard, etc.) that constitute the computer. In a similar
way, the inductive Turing machine M has three abstract devices: a control device A,
which is a 4nite automaton and controls performance of the machine M ; a processor
or operating device H , which corresponds to one or several heads of a conventional
Turing machine; and the memory E, which corresponds to the tape or tapes of a
conventional Turing machine. The memory of the simplest inductive Turing machine
consists of three linear tapes, and the operating device consists of three heads, each of
which is the same as the head of a Turing machine and works with the corresponding
tapes.
The control device A has the state structure or con7guration S =(q0; Q; F) where
Q is the set of states or the state space of A and of M; q0 is an element from Q that
is called the start or initial state, and F is a subset of Q that is called the set of 7nal
(in some cases, accepting) states of M . It is possible to consider a system Q0 of start
states from Q, but this does not change the computing power of an inductive Turing
machine. The automaton A regulates: the state of the whole machine M , the processing
of information by H , and the storage of information in the memory E.
The memory E is divided into di@erent but, as a rule, uniform cells. It is structured
by a system of relations that provide connections or ties between cells. Each cell can
contain a symbol from an alphabet of the languages of the inductive Turing machine
M or it can be empty. Formally, E=(P;W ;K) where P is the set of all cells from
E, W is the set of connection types, and K ⊆P × P is the binary relation on P that
provides connections between cells. In such a way, K structures the memory E. Each
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of the sets P and K is also structured. The set P is enumerated, that is, a one-to-one
mapping  of P into the set N of all natural numbers is given. A type is assigned to
each connection from K by the mapping ! : K →W .
In a general case, cells from the set P also may be of di@erent types. This strat-
i4cation is represented by the mapping " : P → V where V is the set of cell types.
Di@erent types of cells may be used for storing di@erent kinds of symbols. For exam-
ple, binary cells, which have type B, store bits of information represented by symbols
1 and 0. Byte cells (type BT) store information represented by strings of eight binary
digits. Symbol cells (type SB) store symbols of the alphabet(s) of the machine M .
Cells in conventional Turing machines have this type. Natural number cells, which
have type NN, are used in random access machines [1]. Cells in the memory of
quantum computers (type QB) store q-bits or quantum bits. When di@erent kind of
devices are combined into one, this new device has several types of memory cells.
In addition, di@erent types of cells facilitate modeling the brain neuron structure by
inductive Turing machines.
Likewise, the set of cells P is divided into three disjoint parts PI, PW, and PO, where
PI is the input registers, PW is the working memory, and PO is the output registers
of M . Correspondingly, K is divided into three parts KI, KW, and KO which de4ne
connections between the cells from PI, PW, and PO. Usually, input registers are used
only for reading, while output registers are used only for writing. For simplicity, we
consider PI as one register and PO as one register, which are, as a rule, one-dimensional
tapes. Besides, it is possible to consider only such inductive Turing machines that have
the read-only input register or tape.
At the same time, to model a modern computer with its advanced hierarchical mem-
ory, the set P has to be subdivided into more than three components.
Each cell from a linear two-sided tape has two neighbors left and right. The 4rst
cell in a one-sided tape has only one neighbor. The structure of a linear tape (the
standard for Turing machines) is realized by the relation Lin with connections of two
types: R and L. Each cell with the number i is connected to the cell with the number
i + 1 with the connection R, and each cell with the number i + 1 is connected to
the cell with the number i with the connection L (here i=1; 2; 3; : : :). To get a two-
sided linear tape, we reenumerate the corresponding part of P by integer numbers and
use the same connections. To get a two-dimensional tape, we can use ties of four
types W = {R; L; U and D}. Enumeration of cells by natural numbers is transformed
to labeling the cells by pairs of integer numbers. Then each cell (i; j) is connected to
four of its neighbors: to (i + 1; j) by the connection R, to (i − 1; j) by the connection
L, to (i; j + 1) by the connection U , and to (i; j − 1) by the connection D.
It is possible to realize an arbitrary structured memory of an inductive Turing ma-
chine, using only one linear one-sided tape L. To do this, the cells of L are enumer-
ated in the natural order from the 4rst one to in4nity. Then L is decomposed into
three parts according to the parts PI ,PW, and PO of the structured memory. After this
non-linear connections between cells are installed according to the relation K and the
mapping ! : K →W . When an inductive Turing machine with this memory works, the
head/processor is not moving to the right or to the left cell from a given cell, but uses
the installed non-linear connections.
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Such realization of the structured memory allows us to consider an inductive Turing
machine with a structured memory as an inductive Turing machine with conventional
tapes in which additional connections are established. This approach has many advan-
tages. One of them is that inductive Turing machines with a structured memory can
be treated as multitape automata that have additional structure on their tapes. Then it
is conceivable to study di@erent ways to construct this structure.
In addition, this representation of memory allows us to consider any con4guration
in the structured memory E as a word written on this unstructured tape.
In a similar way, it is feasible to build, study and utilize Turing machines with a
structured memory. They have almost the same hardware (they do not necessarily need
the output tape, but always have 4nal states) and the same software as inductive Turing
machines with a structured memory. But in contrast to inductive Turing machines,
Turing machines have to stop to produce a computational result.
If we look at other devices of the inductive Turing machine M , we can see that
the processor H performs information processing in M . However, in comparison to
computers, this operational device performs very simple operations. When H consists
of one unit, it can change a symbol in the cell that is observed by H , and go from this
cell to another using a connection from K . This is exactly what the head of a Turing
machine does.
It is possible that the processor H consists of several processing units similar to heads
of a multihead Turing machine. This allows in a natural way one to model various
real and abstract computing systems by inductive Turing machines. Examples of such
systems are: multiprocessor computers; Turing machines with several tapes; networks,
grids and clusters of computers; cellular automata; neural networks; and systolic arrays.
However, such representation of information processing systems is not always e9cient.
This is why other models of information processing systems have been constructed,
and are and will be utilized.
Connections between the control device A and the processor H may be di@erently
organized:
(1) The processor H may be rigidly connected to A. In this case, the memory E or
its part moves when it is necessary to observe the next cell. This is similar to the
work of a 0oppy disk or CD.
(2) The connection between A and H may be 0exible, allowing H or its parts to move
from one cell to another under the control of A. This structure is virtually realized
when data from the RAM of a computer are taken to registers of arithmetic units
of the same computer.
(3) Another option is that the processor H or its parts function autonomously from
A, only sending to A information about the content of cells. In this case, H or its
parts contain those instructions from the software that regulate operation of H or its
parts. This mode of operation models the intelligent agent approach to computation.
There an agent moves to the location of data and performs its operation at this
new site.
We know that programs constitute computer software and tell the system what to
do (and what to not do). The software R of the inductive Turing machine M is also a
program; it is in the form of simple rules. The traditional representation assumes that
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the processor H functions as one unit. The rules for functioning have the following
form:
qhai → ajqk ; (2)
qhai → cqk : (3)
It is also possible to use only rules of one form:
qhai → ajqkc: (4)
Here qh and qk are states of A, ai and aj are symbols of the alphabet of M , and c
is a type of connection from K .
Each rule directs one step of computation of the inductive Turing machine M . The
rule (2) means that if the state of the control device A of M is qh and the processor H
observes in the cell the symbol ai, then the state of A becomes qk and the processor
H writes the symbol aj in the cell where it is situated. The rule (3) means that the
processor H then moves to the next cell by a connection of the type c. The rule (4)
is a combination of rules (2) and (3).
Like Turing machines, inductive Turing machines can be deterministic and non-
deterministic. For a deterministic inductive Turing machine, there is at most one con-
nection of any type from any cell. In a non-deterministic inductive Turing machine,
several connections of the same type may go from some cells, connecting it with (dif-
ferent) other cells. If there is no connection of this type going from the cell that is
observed by H , then H stays in the same cell. There may be connections of a cell
with itself. Then H also stays in the same cell. It is possible that H observes an empty
cell. To represent this situation, we use the symbol T. Thus, it is possible that some
elements ai and/or aj in the rules from R are equal to T in the rules of both types.
Such rules describe situations when H observes an empty cell and/or when H simply
erases the symbol from some cell, writing nothing in it.
The rules of the type (4) allow an inductive Turing machine to rewrite a symbol in
a cell and to make a move in one step. Other rule representations for inductive Turing
machines separate these operations. Rules of the inductive Turing machine M de4ne
the transition function of M and describe changes of A;H , and E. Consequently, they
also determine the transition functions of A, H , and E.
When the processor H consists of several processing units or heads, there are several
functioning modes:
Uniform synchronized processing (processor units function synchronously): At each
step of M each unit performs one operation; they all are controlled by the same system
of rules.
Uniform concurrent processing (processor units function concurrently): Units per-
form operations independently of one another, but all of them are controlled by the
same system of rules.
Specialized synchronized processing: Each processor unit has its own system of rules,
but all of them function synchronously, i.e., at each step of M each unit performs one
operation.
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Specialized concurrent processing: Each processor unit has its own system of rules
and they perform operations independently of one another.
In what follows, we consider for simplicity only the case when the processor H
consists of one unit and M always starts functioning from the same state. Thus, the
functioning of the inductive Turing machine M begins when the control device A is in
the start state q0 , the working and output memories are empty, and the processor H
observes such a cell in the input register PI that this cell contains some symbol and
has the least number of all non-empty cells in the input register. It is possible that
nothing is written in the input register PI. In this case, H observes an arbitrary cell.
When H observes an empty cell, we denote the content of this cell by the symbol *.
A general step of the machine M has the following form. At the beginning of any
step, the processor H observes some cell with a symbol ai (for an empty cell the
symbol is *) and the control device A is in some state qh.
Then the control device A and/or the processor H choose from the system R of rules
the rule r with the left part equal to qhai and perform the operation prescribed by this
rule. If there is no rule in R with such left part, the machine M stops functioning. If
there are several rules with the same left part, M works as a non-deterministic Turing
machine (e.g., [21,25]) performing all possible operations. When A comes to one of
the 4nal states from F , the machine M also stops functioning. In all other cases, it
continues operation without stopping.
For an abstract automaton, as well as for a computer, two things are important.
Speci4cally, not only how it functions, but also how it obtains its results. In contrast to
Turing machines, inductive Turing machines obtain results even in the case when their
operation is not terminated. This results in essential increase of performance abilities
of systems of algorithms.
The computational result of the inductive Turing machine M is the word that is
written in the output register PO of M : when M halts while its control device A is
in some 4nal state from F , or when M never stops but at some step of computation
the content of the output register PO becomes 4xed and does not change although the
machine M continues to function. In all other cases, M gives no result.
Theorem 3. Any (inductive) Turing machine T with a recursive memory can be simu-
lated by a (inductive) Turing machine D with one conventional tape, i.e., the machine
D computes the same function as T , imitating all moves of T .
Proof here is similar to that for equivalence of di@erent classes of Turing machines.
It is done by the standard procedure in which D writes in a special tape consequent
instantaneous descriptions of the machine T (e.g., [21]).
Some object that, in contrast to Turing machines, an inductive Turing machine does
not always inform a user that a result was obtained. This is the cost that we have to pay
for its higher computational power. However, mathematicians and computer scientists
encountered similar situation with Turing machines. Having the class of all Turing
machines or any other class of recursive algorithms, one never knows whether the
given machine will produce the necessary result or not. In contrast to this, the condition
that an algorithm always gives a result is often demanded. Trying to limit ourselves
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to recursive algorithms that always give a result brings us to the following situations:
either we have a su9ciently powerful class but one cannot distinguish algorithms from
this class from others or we can build all such algorithms but they have insu9cient
computational and decision power. Thus, we have to make a choice: either to use
more powerful algorithms or to know more about algorithms that are used. From this
perspective, an inductive Turing machine is the next step in the evergoing trade o@
between knowledge and power.
6. Learner models and learning potency
The basic models for learning systems here are: a polynomially bounded Turing
machine (PBTM), Turing machine (TM), and inductive Turing machine of the 4rst
order (ITM1).
Denition 11. A Turing machine T is called polynomially bounded if there is a poly-
nomial P(n) and whenever T is given a word x of length n as input, computation of
T halts after making at most P(n) steps.
Denition 12. The memory E is called recursive if the relation K ⊆P×P that provides
connections between cells and all mappings  : P → N ; ! : K →W , and " : P → V are
recursive.
Here recursive means that there are some Turing machines that decide/build all nam-
ing mappings and relations in the structured memory. In addition, we consider poten-
tially achievable knowledge for a given model, which performs without any restrictions
on accessible resources.
Theorem 4. Experience of previous generations does not add to potentially accessible
knowledge for TM learners.
Proof. According to our model, experience of generations is accumulated in the struc-
ture of the memory of the learning model. Here we take a Turing machine M0 with
a structured memory as a model of a learner. This memory is built, i.e., all memory
connections are established, by another Turing machine M1 with a structured memory.
If the memory of M0 is developed by n generations, then the memory of M1 is de-
veloped by (n − 1) generations, and we can prove our statement by induction in the
number n of generations.
(1) n=1. It means that there is only one generation and the learner receives no extra
knowledge to build its memory. Thus, the memory of the learner is one or several linear
tapes of an ordinary Turing machine, and the statement of the theorem is true by the
de4nition.
(2) n¿1 and we assume that the statement of the theorem is true for (n − 1). It
means that the machine M1 that develops the structure of the memory of the machine
M0 is an ordinary Turing machine.
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To prove the necessary result, it is su9cient to show that functioning of M0 can be
modeled by an ordinary Turing machine T . In this case, in spite of its structured mem-
ory containing the experience of n previous generations, M0 can do (and in particular,
can learn) no more than the ordinary Turing machine T .
To model M0, T has a working tape L0 that is used for simulation of the memory of
the machine M0 and the working tape L1 that is used for computation of all connections
in the memory of M0.
The machine T functions in the following way. Simulation of one step of the machine
M0 consists of three stages: at 4rst, T 4nds an instruction u that corresponds to the
relevant instruction v of M0, then (stage 2) T computes the necessary connection that is
prescribed by the instruction v, and only after this (stage 3), T performs the instruction
u. Performance of u may demand several operations of T .
Standard methods of Turing machine modeling described, for example, in [21,25],
allow one to build a machine T that realizes operations of the machine M0 step by
step.
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.
Theorem 5. Experience of previous generations does not add to potentially accessible
knowledge for PBTM learners.
Proof. To prove this statement, we take the proof of Theorem 4 and check that if time
complexity of the machine M0 is bounded by a polynomial P0(n) and time complexity
of the machine M1 is bounded by a polynomial P1(n), then time complexity of the
modeling machine T is bounded by a polynomial Q(n)=P0(kP0(n)) where k is some
number that depends only on M0. The description of functioning of the machine T
allows us to show that this is true and in such a way to prove Theorem 5.
As remarked Paul Stelling, if we take a 4xed length m of input, experience of n
generations with n much bigger than m allows one to achieve exponential, or even
higher complexity, to solve problems that are not polynomially bounded for inputs
with the length less than or equal to m. However, for all inputs, any 4xed number of
generations does not take us outside polynomial boundaries.
For inductive models of learners, we consider only learning of facts.
Denition 13. Inductive Turing machines with recursive memory are called inductive
Turing machines of the 7rst order (ITM1).
Theorem 6. In terms of arithmetical hierarchy, each generation adds one level to
potentially accessible knowledge for ITM1 learners.
Proof. Elements of the arithmetical hierarchy are relations of natural numbers [29].
The set of all recursive relations is taken as the base for building the arithmetical
hierarchy. Levels in the arithmetical hierarchy are labeled as n if they consist of all
relations ∃x1∀x2∃x3 : : :∀xn−2∃xn−1∀xnR(x1; : : : ; xn; z1; : : : ; zm) limited to n−1 pairs of al-
ternating quanti4ers starting with ∃ and having recursive R(x1; : : : ; xn; z1; : : : ; zm). Sim-
ilarly the class of all relations ∀x1∃x2∀x3 : : :∃xn−1∀xnR(x1; : : : ; xn; z1; : : : ; zm) that start
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with ∀ and have n − 1 alternations of quanti4ers is labeled as n and recursive
R(x1; : : : ; xn; z1; : : : ; zm). The classes 0 and 0 are de4ned as having no quanti4ers,
consist of all recursive relations and thus, are equivalent. The classes 1 and 1 are
de4ned as having a single quanti4er: relations from 1 have the form ∃xR(x; y) and
relations from 1 have the form ∀xR(x; y) where R(x; y) is a recursive relation and
y is an arbitrary vector of natural numbers. By the de4nition, we have inclusions
m⊆n ∩n and m⊆n ∩n for any n¿1 and any m¡n.
Results from [29] show that it is su9cient to prove the theorem only for relations
with one free variable, which have the form ∃x1∀x2∃x3 : : :∀xn−2∃xn−1∀xnR(x1; : : : ; xn; z)
or ∀x1∃x2∀x3 : : :∃xn−1∀xnR(x1; : : : ; xn; z) and are some sets of natural numbers.
For the proof, we use induction on the number n of learning generations.
1. As the base for induction, we take one generation. According to the statement
of the theorem this generation has to be able to learn sets from 1 and 1 . Results
of Gold [17,18] and Burgin [10] show that ITM1 learners can learn, that is, decide or
compute, any set from n ∪n.
This completes the 4rst step of our induction.
2. To make a general inductive step, we assume that if we have (n − 1) learning
generations, then the (n−1)th generation can learn any relation from the class n−1 and
the class n−1. Let us consider an arbitrary relation Q(z) that belongs to the class n. It
means that Q(z)=∃x1∀x2∃x3 : : :∀xn−2∃xn−1∀xn R(x1; : : : ; xn; z), where R(x1; : : : ; xn; z), is
a recursive relation. Then, by the de4nition, the relation K(x1; z)=∀x2∃x3 : : :∀xn−2∃xn−1
∀xn R(x1; : : : ; xn; z) belongs to the class n−1.
By our assumption, a learner from the (n − 1)th generation can decide whether a
given pair (x, z) belongs to the relation K(x1; z) or not. Utilizing this knowledge, an
ITM1 learner M checks if the pair (1; z) belongs to K(x1; z). Then it checks if the pair
(2; z) belongs to K(x1; z). Then it repeats the same for the pair (3; z) and so on. After
each test with a negative result, M writes 0 on its output tape. If one of these tests
gives the positive result, then M writes 0 on its output tape and continues to do so
forever.
In such a way, the result of M is 1 when z belongs to Q(z) and is 0 when z does
not belong to Q(z). It means that M learns the fact whether z belongs to Q(z) or not.
In a similar way, we can prove that some ITM1 learner M decides whether an
arbitrary number z belongs to Q(z) or not for an arbitrary relation Q(x) that belongs
to the class n . The di@erence in the proof is that in this case M outputs 1 when
before it gave 0 and outputs 0 when before it gave 1.
This completes the general step of our induction.
By induction the statement of the theorem is true. Theorem 6 is proved.
7. Conclusion
The paper analyzed how power grows when a learner uses the experience of previous
generations. It is demonstrated that neither recursive nor subrecursive algorithms give
any increase of potentially learnable knowledge. Only super-recursive algorithms allow
achieving better results in strati4ed learning.
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These results explain why the historical approach to education is good for history,
art, and literature, but is bad for mathematics and natural sciences. The reason is that
mathematics and natural sciences do not achieve independent results. Due to their
quest for uni4cation, they build shortcuts. This is possible only using experience and
knowledge of previous generations. Consequently, long ways by which past generations
reached essential results become unreasonable.
To conclude, we formulate some open problems. An interesting problem is to con-
sider how experience of generations in0uences other learner models, for instance, such
as Turing machines with oracles or with advice and inductive Turing machines with
oracles or with advice.
As it has been demonstrated (cf., [31]), learning/cognition in teams is more powerful
and e9cient than individual learning. That is why another interesting problem is to
consider how experience of generations in0uences learning and cognition in a group.
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